Public Bill Committee

[Mr. Edward O’Hara in the Chair]

Edward O'Hara: I welcome everyone to the Committee. I remind Members that there is a money resolution in connection with the Bill and that copies are available in the room. As usual, I remind Members that adequate notice of amendments should be given. As a general rule, I and my co-Chairman do not intend to call starred amendments, including those that might be reached during an afternoon sitting. Before anyone asks, if Members wish to remove their jackets, they may do so.

Jim Fitzpatrick: I beg to move,
That—
(1) the Committee shall (in addition to its first meeting at 10.30 a.m. on Tuesday 9th January) meet—
(a) at 4.00 p.m. on Tuesday 9th January;
(b) at 9.30 a.m. and 2.00 p.m. on Thursday 11th January;
(c) at 10.30 a.m. and 4.00 p.m. on Tuesday 16th January;
(d) at 9.30 a.m. and 2.00 p.m. on Thursday 18th January;
(e) at 10.30 a.m. and 4.00 p.m. on Tuesday 23rd January;
(2) the proceedings shall be taken in the following order: Clauses 1 to 4; Schedule 1; Clauses 5 to 52; Schedule 2; Clauses 53 and 54; new Clauses; new Schedules; remaining proceedings on the Bill;
(3) the proceedings shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at 7.00 p.m. on Tuesday 23rd January.
Thank you for your remarks, Mr. O’Hara, and it is a pleasure to see you presiding over us today. I am sure that all members of the Committee will benefit from the guidance that you and your co-Chairman will provide as we scrutinise the details of the Bill. May I offer apologies for the Minister for Housing and Planning, who has been delayed on urgent Government business but will be with us in due course? Apologies have been offered to the Opposition parties.
On 12 December 2006, the House passed a programme motion that provides for the Committee’s proceedings to conclude on 23 January, and on 18 December, the Programming Sub-Committee agreed a programme resolution for the Greater London Authority Bill Committee. The resolution provides that the order of consideration follow the order of clauses in the Bill and that schedules be considered alongside the clauses that introduce them. I hope that hon. Members find the arrangements set out in the resolution satisfactory.

Michael Gove: First, I welcome the Minister to his place and you, Mr. O’Hara, to the Chair. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship. I look forward to your wise guidance and that of your co-Chairman, the hon. Member for Congleton (Ann Winterton).
I imagine that I will rely rather more on your wise guidance than will the Minister, as this is the first substantial Bill Committee on which I have served. Due to the vagaries of the operation of my own party, I find myself serving on the Front Bench. I suspect that in the days to come I will find myself tripping over schedules, amendments and other aspects of the legislative process. If your kind, guiding hand, Mr. O’Hara, can take me out of the thickets into which I stray and back to the straight and narrow, I will be immensely grateful.
 On the time allocated for debate, allow me first to enter a note of regret. One change suggested by the Leader of the House is that public Bills coming before the House in this calendar year should be subject to a new procedure that allows us to take evidence, much though not entirely in the manner of a Select Committee. Given the nature of the Bill, and the number of bodies throughout the capital that have an interest in submitting evidence, we on this side of the Committee—I suspect that we are joined by the Liberal Democrats—think it a pity that the new, enhanced scrutiny procedure is not in place. However, we understand why the Government have decided to press ahead without that enhanced procedure. While we express our regret that it is not in place, we will endeavour to do our best to work within the time constraints.
Given those constraints—the 10 sittings we have in front of us—we will try our best to move expeditiously through those measures that are less controversial to allow sufficient time to debate those that cause greater controversy and division across the Benches. The Government have had ample opportunity to prepare the legislation and there has been pre-legislative consultation. Indeed, it is because of that pre-legislative consultation that the Government argue that there is no need for us to operate under the new, enhanced Public Bill Committee procedure.
Given that, we confidently expect that the Government will not introduce their own amendments. If they do, and if they acknowledge that their legislation is flawed and have to hurry into Committee with significant proposals, we might find the current allocation of time insufficient. With that caveat—that rider—we are happy to accept the good offices of the usual channels.

Tom Brake: I, too, welcome you to the Chair, Mr. O’Hara, and I am sure that you will do us proud during our proceedings over the next few weeks. I also welcome the Minister.
Like the hon. Member for Surrey Heath, we regret that it has not been possible to use the enhanced consideration procedure. However, the 10 sittings that have been allocated to us should be sufficient if we set priorities. The hon. Gentleman said that he is new to such proceedings. He will soon learn that, unfortunately, there is no clear correlation between the amount of time spent in Committee and the number of amendments that the Government accept. In fact, the two are completely unconnected. Adding sittings is no guarantee that a Bill will change beyond recognition.
The time available should be sufficient, and I will ensure that we do not get in the way of allowing time to debate controversial issues by unnecessarily spending time on matters on which we all agree.

Jim Fitzpatrick: I am grateful for the constructive comments made by the spokesmen for both Opposition parties and welcome them to the Committee. I am sure that we will have a constructive few weeks. I also welcome my hon. Friends, who are supporting the Government’s endeavours.
I hear what the hon. Member for Surrey Heath says about Government amendments. I cannot say that we will not table proposals, but we will do everything we can to expedite business and ensure that we can scrutinise the Bill fully.

Question put and agreed to.

Ordered,
That, subject to the discretion of the Chair, any written evidence received by the Committee shall be reported to the House for publication.—[Jim Fitzpatrick.]

Edward O'Hara: Copies of the memorandums received so far are available in the room. I welcome the constructive comments that have been made, which bode well for the progress of the Bill.

List of memorandums relating to the Greater London Authority Bill reported to the House for publication

GLA 1 London Assembly
GLA 2 City of London Corporation

Clause 1

Payments on ceasing to hold office as Mayor or Assembly member

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Jim Fitzpatrick: The clause will enable the Mayor of London and the London assembly to establish and administer schemes to allow the Mayor and assembly members to receive a payment on ceasing to hold office. A scheme may be set up if the Mayor and assembly, acting jointly, agree to establish one.
In 2005, the Senior Salaries Review Body recommended that a severance scheme be introduced for the Mayor and assembly members, following a request from the Greater London authority’s head of paid service to review the salaries, allowances, pensions and severance payments of the Mayor, deputy Mayor and assembly members. Allowing such a scheme to be established will remove an anomaly: although the GLA is allowed to make pension provision for someone who ceases to be Mayor or an assembly member, it is not allowed to provide a payment when such a person ceases to hold office. The change will bring arrangements for the GLA in line with those for Members of the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 1 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 2

Consultation

Michael Gove: I beg to move amendment No. 30, in clause 2, page 2, line 21, leave out
‘or any of the functional bodies’
and insert
‘, any of the functional bodies or such body representative of the London borough councils’.
The amendment is simple and intended to clarify the consultation procedure that the Mayor must go through. The Greater London Authority Act 1999 lists bodies to be given priority in consultation. We seek to amend it to ensure that the consultation procedure takes into account one vital, currently missing body.
 If there is a theme or leitmotif that we shall attempt to introduce in our scrutiny of the Bill, it is the importance of ensuring that devolution goes to the lowest possible level. One of our concerns is that while the Bill will grant welcome additional powers, which currently lie with central Government and their agencies, to the accountable office of the Mayor, it will also take from the boroughs powers that should remain in their hands without ensuring that they and the assembly have a balancing role in ensuring that the Mayor’s functions are discharged effectively.
In keeping with that theme, the amendment would add to the list of primary consultees the constituent body that represents London councils, so London Councils—formerly the Association of London Government—should have equal consultation status with the Greater London assembly. It seems appropriate that that body should be given that status, because so many of the Mayor’s responsibilities depend on the boroughs for their effective discharge. The original conception of the Mayor’s role was strategic. In that respect, many of the delivery functions outside the scope of the functional bodies devolve on to the boroughs. It is only appropriate, therefore, when it comes to the preparation of the Mayor’s strategies, that the Mayor take full account of what London boroughs think, through the representative body that speaks for them all. I hope that the Government have no objection to making this small but constructive amendment, in the spirit of increased and enhanced scrutiny and the principle of devolution.

Tom Brake: We support the Conservative amendment. Clause 2 strengthens the assembly’s role, requiring the Mayor to respond with reasons to the comments of the assembly and functional bodies on draft and revised strategies. The amendment proposed by the official Opposition would require the Mayor to respond similarly to the comments of London Councils, the representative body of London government.
The hon. Member for Surrey Heath says that he wants devolution to the lowest possible level. It could be argued that if he wants to push the matter further the amendment should call for the obligation to apply in the case of all London boroughs, because London Councils represents a collective view rather than that of each borough. Although the amendment does not go far enough in terms of devolution, it is worthy, and I shall listen carefully to the Minister to find out whether the Government accept that it has some validity.

Jim Fitzpatrick: The Government do not support the amendment. I accept what the hon. Member for Surrey Heath says in that we are trying to achieve the correct balance in many areas of the Bill, but we do not agree that the amendment addresses that aim. In preparing or revising his statutory strategies, the Mayor is required to consult within the GLA group, the assembly and the functional bodies before consulting more widely.
Clause 2, as the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington says, sharpens up the Greater London assembly’s role in policy development by placing an explicit requirement on the Mayor to have regard to the comments of the assembly and the functional bodies in response to consultation. It also requires the Mayor to write to the assembly, identifying which comments he accepts and giving his reasons when he does not accept assembly recommendations.
The amendment would require the Mayor to have regard to the comment of any body representative of the London boroughs when he consults on drafts or revisions to his strategies. Section 42 of the 1999 Act already provides that the Mayor should consult the London boroughs on draft strategies. The views of the London boroughs, alongside those of other external stakeholders, provide an important contribution to the development of the Mayor’s strategies. I feel sure that the Mayor carefully considers all those responses during the consultation process. It is not, therefore, necessary to place an explicit requirement on the Mayor to have regard to those comments, as the amendment would do.

Michael Gove: I am disappointed that the Minister feels that he cannot accept the amendment. All that we seek to do is ensure that the representative body of London boroughs enjoys the same rights as the London assembly in the process of consultation. It seems to me that the existing responsibility that is placed on the Mayor to consult London boroughs gives them second-class status relative to the London assembly. The existing responsibility is to consult each London borough after the priorities are given to the assembly and to the functional bodies. It is wrong that London boroughs should have that second-class status. It also seems wrong that the Mayor should have a prior requirement to consult with the functional bodies, many of which are composed of his own appointees, before consulting the representative voice of all London’s local government.
The Minister must be aware that there is grave disquiet about other parts of the Bill, which will take power away from boroughs and place it in the hands of the Mayor. The amendment would be one small step to acknowledge that when strategies are developed, the coherent unitary voice of London’s boroughs is heard. The Minister could make a simple concession to show that the Bill is intended to respect the rights of the boroughs rather than, as many of us fear, simply to take their powers away whenever the possibility is presented.

Jim Fitzpatrick: I am disappointed that the hon. Gentleman is disappointed, although I suspect that this will not be the only time during the next few weeks that he will feel that way. I have said why we do not believe it appropriate to put an explicit duty on the Mayor. For example, we are improving the procedures for the assembly to hold the Mayor to account, and the Mayor has to show greater regard to the assembly’s observations on the strategies by virtue of having to write and explain how he arrives at his decisions. We believe that the Mayor already takes into account the observations from London Councils, which I accept entirely is an important strategic body in local government in London, and that he already gives due weight to its views. We do not believe that the amendment is necessary.

Amendment negatived.

Stephen Pound: On a point of order, Mr O’Hara.

Edward O'Hara: Before I take the point of order, it appears that that amendment could have been withdrawn.

Stephen Pound: On a point of order, Mr. O’Hara. Would you advise the Committee whether GLA members, who clearly have a financial interest in clauses such as clause 1, are best advised to excuse themselves while discussion of those matters is taking place or whether it is sufficient for them to make a declaration? We are always delighted to see the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst, but we do not want him to be caused any embarrassment.

Edward O'Hara: I do not think that that is a matter for me to determine. If any hon. Members have such concerns, they should consult the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards, not the Chairman of this Committee.

Bob Neill: Further to that point of order, Mr. O’Hara. May I thank the hon. Member for Ealing, North for his welcome; apologise for being late, thanks to the rail timetable change announced yesterday; and say that I will certainly take appropriate advice? I would no more want to be in that position than he would, as I am sure he knows.

Edward O'Hara: I think that disposes of that point of order.

Clause 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 3

The Mayor’s periodic report to the Assembly

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Jim Fitzpatrick: The 1999 Act requires the assembly to hold 10 meetings a year to consider written reports submitted by the Mayor for each meeting and to put written or oral questions to the Mayor. The Mayor must submit his report to the assembly at least three clear working days before each meeting. Clause 3 amends that deadline to require the Mayor to submit his report to the assembly at least five clear working days before each assembly meeting. That will give the assembly more time to consider the Mayor’s report before he appears before it to answer questions.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 3 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 4

Confirmation hearings etc for certain appointments by the Mayor

Tom Brake: I beg to move amendment No. 7, in clause 4, page 3, line 13, after second ‘chairman’, insert ‘, or any member’.

Edward O'Hara: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:
No. 8, in clause 4, page 3, line 15, after second ‘chairman’, insert ‘, or any member’.
No. 9, in clause 4, page 3, line 18, after second ‘chairman’, insert ‘, or any member’.
No. 10, in clause 4, page 3, line 20, after ‘chairman’, insert ‘, or any member,’.
No. 11, in clause 4, page 3, line 22, after ‘chair’, insert ‘, or any member,’.
No. 12, in clause 4, page 3, line 24, after second ‘chairman’, insert ‘, or any member’.
No. 13, in clause 4, page 3, line 25, at end insert—
‘members of the Board of Governors of the Museum of London appointed by the Greater London Authority under the Museum of London Act 1965 (c. 17).’.
No. 14, in clause 4, page 3, line 25, at end insert—
‘members appointed under section 377A.’.
No. 37, in clause 4, page 3, line 25, at end insert—
‘any member of a body established under section 24B of the Learning and Skills Act 2000 (c.21).’.
No. 38, in clause 4, page 3, line 31, at end insert—
‘(6) Before making an order under subsection (5), the Secretary of State shall—
(a) consult the Mayor and Assembly, and
(b) have regard to any views expressed by them.’.

Tom Brake: The Minister will note that we are being true to our word in not delaying proceedings. My only concern is that we are perhaps moving too fast in respect of the notes that I prepared.
 The power to make appointments to London-wide public bodies is a key way for the Mayor to exert influence in the capital. Clause 4 is therefore welcome for introducing much greater accountability and transparency to the appointments process. However, the Bill is overly hesitant, as the new power will apply to only 10 key mayoral appointments, which leaves more than 70 additional unelected senior posts in key public bodies to which the Mayor could make appointments without any public oversight by the assembly.
Those public bodies are responsible for setting strategic priorities, delivering key services and spending billions of pounds of London taxpayers’ money. We welcome the fact that the Bill concedes the usefulness of confirmation hearings in principle, but it is not clear why that principle should not be extended to all mayoral appointments to public bodies in London. The public should have confidence that all mayoral appointments are made on the basis of merit and not as a reward for political loyalty or as an act of unaccountable mayoral patronage.
The amendments would not grant the assembly the power of veto over the Mayor’s powers of appointment, so the Mayor could still appoint. That would not be an issue. The assembly’s recommendations would not be binding, but they would provide an opportunity to focus public scrutiny on the credentials of the candidates for key public posts in London, which would provide an important test of the credibility and fitness to hold public office of the proposed appointees. That is the purpose of the amendments, which also have the support of the official Opposition.
London assembly members agree with me that it is important that these key amendments are accepted in Committee. They all have the unanimous support of all the political parties in the London assembly. Confirmation hearings are a new concept in this country and Parliament has a responsibility to get this right first time. Amendments Nos. 7 to 14 and 37 would extend the power to hold confirmation hearings to members other than chairs and deputy chairs and to the Museum of London, the Mayor’s cultural strategy group and the Learning and Skills Council.
Appointments to the boards of those bodies are worthy of the same scrutiny. For example, the Museum of London is at the heart of London. It is visited by more than 100,000 schoolchildren every year and it reinforces their sense of the history of London, their citizenship and their sense of belonging to the city. The Museum of London website is promoting an interesting initiative this year: people can buy any year of London’s history between 1666 and 2012, although I am not sure who they are buying it from. The Mayor has gone for 2012, for obvious reasons.
I point out to the hon. Member for Surrey Heath the fact that 1979 is still available for those who want to celebrate the coming to power of Margaret Thatcher. I understand from a transcript of a recent interview that the hon. Gentleman believes that she did nearly everything right and was a heroic character.

Michael Gove: Will the hon. Gentleman tell us whether 1983 is available? That is when Aberdeen won the European Cup Winner’s cup in Gothenburg, beating Real Madrid 2-1.

Tom Brake: I have absolutely no idea, but the hon. Gentleman can look on the website, which clearly indicates which years are for sale.
The amendments are necessary to prevent the inconsistency of the chair of a body being subject to a confirmation hearing, but not his or her immediate subordinates. Such a chair might be undermined by the Mayor’s appointees, who would not be subject to the same scrutiny by the assembly.
In a recent meeting, London First expressed concern that if this amendment were supported by the Government and adopted, that would lead to London grinding to a halt when a new Mayor was elected, because of the need to carry out a large number of confirmation hearings. It is worth stressing again that the amendment would provide such a power, but that that power would not have to be exercised except when the appointment of a board member was deemed to be particularly controversial. Many of the board posts are four-yearly; confirmation hearings would therefore not be an annual event for 77 posts. In most cases, they would happen only every four years, and only if there was a need for that greater scrutiny.
Amendment No. 38 would require the Secretary of State to consult the assembly and the Mayor before making an order that amended the list of appointments that are subject to confirmation hearings. I hope that the Minister understands why the assembly and the Mayor would want an opportunity to comment on any such proposals or changes put forward by the Secretary of State. This is a standard provision for secondary legislation that relates to specific bodies, and it clearly makes sense.
I consider, as I hope the official Opposition do, that the amendment would strengthen the Government’s case for improved scrutiny and transparency in the appointments process. I hope that the Minister is willing to take on board those very minor changes.

Bob Neill: It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr. O’Hara. Having extended one set of apologies, I would like to say that I am glad that, for once, it was not the Minister or me who brought football into the discussion. In case I have not formally declared it, I remind everyone of my involvement as a member of the London assembly. I do not think that the clause has any effect on any potential conflict of interest or any financial matter.
First, I would like to give an example to reinforce a point made by the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington. The boards, such as those of Transport for London, have executive power. As Labour Members will know, the Mayor sought to push forward a scheme for the Thames Gateway bridge, which was approved only by a very narrow majority of the board of Transport for London. There was a prospect—I think there were only one or two votes in it—that the board would come to a conclusion different from the Mayor’s. In those circumstances, it is not unreasonable that there should be an opportunity for the assembly to know where potential nominees to the board of Transport for London are coming from on an issue of such significance, which might have indicated a potential difference of political opinion between the Mayor and those whom he was nominating to the board. It would have been useful and desirable to know that in advance.
Secondly, the principle is excellent, and I am grateful to the Minister for listening to the assembly and taking on board what it said. This a matter that we raised with him, so I have no problem with it, and what I say is intended to be wholly constructive. I understand that the names and posts listed are an initial attempt, but within the Mayor’s administration, the nature of which may change under this Mayor or in future, there are other posts of huge significance. It is not disrespectful to post holders named here to suggest that the Mayor’s policy directors, who are not subject to any scrutiny, exercise hugely more power and receive significantly greater remuneration than they do. People such as Redmond O’Neill and John Ross are well known as powerful figures in the Mayor’s administration.
 There is nothing wrong with that—no criticism—but if we are scrutinising the nominees for chairman of the cultural strategy group, should there not be the opportunity to consider other powerful posts, on the board of Transport for London or beyond, that exercise as much influence on the direction of mayoral policy as any of the posts listed in the clause? In that constructive spirit, I support the amendment.

Stephen Pound: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Bob Neill: I am always happy to give way to the hon. Gentleman. [Interruption.] I am so naive and innocent.

Stephen Pound: The words naive and innocent have never been associated with Bromley and Chislehurst in the past or the present.
 I am trying to follow the hon. Gentleman’s argument, which is logical up to a point. Does he envisage a cut-off point on financial levels? Is he talking about every employer above a certain salary level, or is he categorising by service head or job description? Which group of people is he talking about?

Bob Neill: I was not seeking to go into particular financial cut-off points, but I was using an example. The public will be aware of the significant power and influence that is exercised, the effect on the budget—I put no more emphasis on it than that—in policy terms and the profile of many people who influence the administration but who are not on the list in the clause. That is my point.

Tom Brake: Does the hon. Gentleman agree that the core group of people comprises the chair, deputy chair and governors or board members of the key functional bodies, such as the Museum of London? We are considering in total 77 people.

Bob Neill: The hon. Gentleman is right. The assembly recognised, when it sought to support an extension along the lines of the amendment, that it would not always be desirable to scrutinise every nominee who fell within the potential heads and that, in practice, the measure would be self-limiting. It is worth remembering that there was widespread cross-party support for that in the assembly. This is not a narrow, partisan position. The opportunity for scrutiny should be included, as the hon. Gentleman has rightly said. The amendment would strengthen the principle that the Minister and his colleagues are seeking to introduce and would have a fair wind of support from all parties in the assembly, which is a good thing that will enable it to work better, as we all want.

Michael Gove: I support the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington and echo some of the sentiments expressed so ably by my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst.
The principle of confirmation hearings may seem, at first glance, new to the British constitution and is something that we more commonly associate with the American system with its powerful Senate Committees. On the selection of Supreme Court judges or cabinet appointees in America, Senate Committees can scrutinise the records of those who are being appointed to important public offices and, if necessary, recommend their refusal. That principle is hallowed in America and has increasingly been adopted here in the United Kingdom. One striking example of its adoption is in respect of members of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England.
With the decision of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to make the Bank of England independent—probably his first and perhaps his last good decision—came an acknowledgement that this arm’s length devolution of power from the Executive should be accompanied by enhanced parliamentary scrutiny. That is why, when any new member of the MPC is put forward by the Chancellor and nominated to that body, the confirmation process takes place and Treasury Committee members have an opportunity to quiz them to assess their suitability for office and, importantly, to gauge their position on various issues to ensure that the MPC is balanced. We recognise that, in developing an appropriate counter-inflation strategy for this country, the mix of expertise, background and views matters. There is an established parliamentary precedent as well as an established international precedent for confirmation hearings. We welcome the fact that confirmation hearings should be extended to the GLA.
As the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington has pointed out, many of the people who are appointed by the Mayor are responsible for huge budgets. The functional bodies—Transport for London, the London Development Agency and the Metropolitan Police Authority—are responsible for millions of pounds of public money. They are responsible, furthermore, for the discharge of services that intimately affect the lives of all Londoners. In the case of the Metropolitan Police Authority it is not only Londoners who are affected, because the MPA is the lead police force in dealing with anti-terrorism, royal protection and other vital security matters. So the people who are appointed to the MPA have a role, a status, an influence and a responsibility that extends beyond London’s boundaries, and the idea of introducing greater transparency, accountability and scrutiny into such appointments is one that we wholeheartedly welcome.
As the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington has pointed out, however, there is a flaw in the Government proposal, because the Government seem to have embraced the idea of confirmation hearings yet flinched from the full consequences of their logic. The Government proposal would allow confirmation hearings only for chairmen or deputy chairmen of the respective bodies. It is important to appreciate that, although those figures are the most important, they are not the only important figures. Many of those appointed to other roles—to the MPA, for instance—can exercise significant influence. An example would be the position occupied by Mr. Peter Herbert, who sits on the MPA and who is not elected but directly appointed. He is a figure whose past record at the Greater London Council and elsewhere might give rise to concerns on the part of some people about his views and how those views might affect the discharge of the MPA’s responsibilities. I myself cast no aspersions on his suitability for the office—on the evidence that has come to me, he has discharged his responsibilities in an exemplary fashion. At the time of his appointment, however, it was understandable that some people might have taken a moment to express concern, and at some point in the future the Mayor might wish to appoint to Transport for London, or to the LDA or MPA, individuals below the level of chair or deputy chair whose views or responsibilities might cause the public to wonder why there is not more scrutiny.

Karen Buck: I am slightly confused by the hon. Gentleman’s argument. He is drawing parallels with the MPC. However, is it not part of the point of having confirmation hearings that the authority is not an executive one? It is precisely because the Mayor has executive power that it is not comparable. The Mayor is also subject to the scrutiny of the electoral process, so going beyond key appointments is an entirely unnecessary level of intervention.

Michael Gove: It is interesting to hear the hon. Lady make that point, because she is arguing in effect against Londoners being given more information on how they are governed and on who governs them. The whole point of the confirmation hearing and of the amendment is that with every appointment made to such bodies, there should be an opportunity for accountable public debate on who is appointed. Whenever the Mayor makes a nomination at the moment, there can, of course, be external scrutiny by the press, or in this House, and questions can be raised. We seek to ensure that the process is regularised and formalised, and that there is an appropriate way to ensure that due process is followed. If the current Mayor, or any future Mayor, is confident that he is appointing the best men and women, he should not fear scrutiny or a confirmation hearing. In fact, a hearing would only bolster public confidence in the way in which London is governed and in the way in which the Mayor makes such decisions. I see no argument for decreasing scrutiny or transparency.

Karen Buck: The term that the hon. Gentleman has missed out from his list is “extension”. It is not that key appointments should not be properly scrutinised, but that a balance must be struck when someone—in this case, the Mayor—has executive authority that allows them to retain that authority. That balance must maintain public confidence in a number of ways, including hearings for key posts, but it must not over-egg the pudding by extending hearings right down to the most junior staff members, as the hon. Gentleman has suggested.

Michael Gove: Again, I think that the hon. Lady has misunderstood both the spirit and the letter of the amendment. We are not suggesting scrutiny of the most junior staff members, such as junior aides or administrative assistants. We are talking principally about the members of functional bodies. My hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst has pointed out that some individuals in other senior posts in the Mayor’s establishment have responsibilities ranking, in terms of influence and reach, with those of members of functional bodies.
I shall draw an example to the attention of the hon. Lady and the Committee. The chair and deputy chair of one of the functional bodies may well go through the scrutiny process, but those two individuals’ freedom of action could be undermined by the appointment at a future Mayor’s behest of other members who work against them. To those people who say, “Oh, the very idea! Imagine the authority of the head of a London-wide body being subverted from within,” I say remember what happened to Lord McIntosh many years ago, when another figure managed to subvert from within. There is a precedent in London governance for the head of an organisation to find that others burrow from within to subvert his authority. Talking of burrowing—

Stephen Pound: During his time in this House, the hon. Gentleman has earned himself a reputation as a skilled forensic scientist, and his language is normally very precise. He used the word “principally” in the context of the amendment. Unfortunately, that word is loose and ill-defined. It worries us that he seems to be opening up the provisions to a limitless number of people. Will he remove the word “principally” and concentrate on precisely those grades of staff to which he is referring?

Michael Gove: The hon. Gentleman has allowed himself to be confused by some of the—how can I put this? [Interruption.] No, no. The word that I was searching for is “chaff”. He has allowed himself to be confused by the chaff thrown up by the hon. Member for Regent’s Park and Kensington, North. The amendment is precise. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington for framing it, because it is perfectly clear to whom it would apply. It would apply precisely to members of functional bodies and extend to the Museum of London, because that is an existing body to which the Mayor will have a new right to appoint governance.
It is entirely precise whom the amendment would cover. My hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst pointed out what is no more than a matter of fact—that other individuals appointed by the Mayor have significant powers—but all that the amendment seeks to do is ensure that other members of functional bodies appointed by the Mayor are subject to the confirmation process.

Tom Brake: It is clear that Government Members have a degree of support for the proposed measures, but they are seeking clarity as to which people will be affected. Perhaps we can come to an agreement that we are literally talking only about the seven individuals who will serve on the different boards. The amendment sets that out clearly. If hon. Members would consider it more carefully than they have so far, they will see to which boards we are referring. It is very clear.

Michael Gove: The hon. Gentleman has amplified and underlined my point. We have not only numbered but listed the precise appointments. If it is not clear after reading the amendment, I suggest that the hon. Members for Regent’s Park and Kensington, North and for Ealing, North talk to the Labour members of the Greater London Assembly who support the proposed measures.
One of the striking things about the amendment is that it has the support of every Member of the GLA. Why? Because all of them, whatever their ideological views, recognise that the principal role envisaged for the GLA when it was established was scrutiny. The principal function of a scrutinising body is to scrutinise how public money is spent. The principal bodies that spend public money in London at the Mayor’s behest are the functional bodies, and the principal individuals who are responsible for spending that money are members of the board. Four sets of principles are at the heart of the amendment.
 I hope that the Minister will listen to his colleagues on the Greater London assembly, who are entirely in favour of the extension of the confirmation process from those figures named under the legislation to those figures named under our amendment. If he does, he not only will win the support and applause of Conservative and Liberal Democrat Members of Parliament, but—this will come sweeter to his ear—he will win the applause of those hard-working Labour members of the GLA who want to work even harder in the interests of Londoners by scrutinising the Mayor’s work.

Jim Fitzpatrick: I take the point made by the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington about getting ahead of ourselves. I am sure that the Government Whip, my hon. Friend the Member for Chatham and Aylesford, via the usual channels and you, Mr. O’Hara, can reassure us that that will not be the case. I also acknowledge the experience that the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst brings to the Committee as a serving member of the GLA. However, that does not mean that we shall accept the conclusions that he has drawn from his time there.
Confirmation hearings will provide the assembly with an important and exciting new power that its members could use to good effect. They will allow assembly members to scrutinise appointments that the Mayor intends to make; they will assist in assessing the calibre of candidates and their suitability for appointment; and they will enable assembly members to establish candidates’ plans for their new roles and, if necessary, to challenge an appointment before the Mayor makes his final decision.
We have great difficulty with amendments Nos. 7 to 14 and amendment No. 37, which seek to specify further offices to which confirmation hearings may apply, which is neither necessary nor desirable at this stage. We believe that it is sensible to allow the new process to bed down and for the assembly to make a success of its new role before considering whether to extend the list of offices to which the hearings may apply. We propose that the assembly should initially concentrate on scrutinising the most important appointments that the Mayor makes—those that have the greatest influence on delivery, particularly the chairs and deputy chairs of the functional bodies.
 The amendments would result in the assembly being faced with a bewildering array of offices—our calculations indicate that it would be more than 100 offices. I acknowledge that the calculations by the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington have produced a different figure, but none the less there would be a greater number of offices on which to decide whether to hold a confirmation hearing. We are not setting in stone the number of offices subject to confirmation hearings. Clause 4 provides for the Secretary of State to specify further offices by order, should she wish to do so. Should the need arise, it provides the flexibility to extend the list of offices without the requirement for primary legislation.
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington for explaining amendment No. 38. It seems sensible that, should the Secretary of State wish to consider further offices being subject to confirmation hearings, she should seek the views of the Mayor and the assembly before deciding on an appropriate course of action. However, I do not believe it necessary that the Bill should require the Secretary of State to have regard to the views of the Mayor and the assembly, but I welcome the opportunity to consider the amendment more carefully to see whether we can introduce a suitably drafted proposal at a later stage.

Stephen Pound: On that point, and in the spirit of the search for clarity and consensus, which is so typical of the Committee, I draw attention to amendments Nos. 9 and 10, which refer to the MPA and the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority. If we are to extend the measure beyond the two titular roles, who will do the confirmations? Will not the members be interviewing themselves? Has my hon. Friend given any thought to that?

Jim Fitzpatrick: We certainly have. Government officials have looked at all the functional bodies and those members who are appointed by the Mayor as opposed to those who are appointed by the boards and Secretaries of State that make up a variety of different categories. That is why we are suggesting that it is not appropriate to extend matters beyond the chairs and vice-chairs, but the issue could be revisited in due course to see whether there should be an extension of hearings for appropriate members. The maximum number of appointments that we calculate from the bodies mentioned in the amendments is 135, and I can certainly share where we have got that information from with the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington. With that assurance in respect of amendment No. 38, I hope that he will not press it now. However, we do not accept the other amendments, which we ask to be withdrawn.

Tom Brake: I thank the Minister for his response, and his indication that the Government are proposing to move forward with a draft amendment at a later stage to amendment No. 38, which relates to the Secretary of State. I am sure that the official Opposition thank him as well, because that is clearly helpful.
I am disappointed that on the real substance of this debate, the confirmation hearings, I have heard nothing from the Minister to explain why the Government accept in principle that confirmation hearings are appropriate for the chairs and deputy chairs of a whole range of bodies, but are not for other board members, who, in a worst case scenario, could have the power to subvert the activities of those boards, even if the chair and deputy chair had been subject to scrutiny and were clearly appropriate for the job. Being disappointed in that respect, I will therefore press the amendment.

Question put, That the amendment be made:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 5, Noes 9.

Question accordingly negatived.

Edward O'Hara: Is amendment No. 38 being pressed to a vote?

Tom Brake: No, on the basis that the Minister has confirmed that the Government will come forward with a draft amendment in future, I will not press amendment No. 38.

Edward O'Hara: Unless I hear strong objections to the contrary, the nature of the debate on these amendments is such that we may take it that the clause stand part debate has been held, so I will put that straight to the vote.

Motion made, and Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 9, Noes 5.

Question accordingly agreed to.

Clause 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 1

Confirmation hearings etc: Schedule 4A to the GLA Act 1999

Michael Gove: I beg to move amendment No. 50, in schedule 1, page 52, line 4, leave out sub-paragraph (2) and insert—
‘(2) The Mayor requires the consent of the Assembly to the proposed appointment by a simple majority.’.

Edward O'Hara: With this it will be convenient to consider amendment No. 51, in schedule 1, page 52, leave out lines 9 to 12.

Michael Gove: I confess that we would have been prepared to withdraw the amendment had the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington and my hon. Friends been successful in the previous debate. We sought only to improve the scrutiny power of the GLA, and the option in front of us was to ensure that confirmation hearings extend across the piece. As I have outlined, the view of every party in the GLA is that that should happen. Sadly, there is a split in the Labour ranks between the parliamentary party, perhaps jealous of its privileges or anxious to shield its old friend the Mayor from scrutiny, and those in the GLA actively engaged in scrutiny work, who have been deprived of a valuable scrutinising power.
What can Conservative Members do to help the GLA enhance its powers of scrutiny? We have outlined how another weapon can be placed in its hands by ensuring that its existing scrutiny power on appointments has teeth. We originally wanted to ensure that the confirmation process involves probing the views of those appointed to functional bodies, assessing their suitability and ensuring that their fitness for office and the views that they carry forward to the discharge of their duties are examined appropriately and transparently. We have been denied that opportunity, but we can ensure that the Mayor thinks twice before making appointments to the crucial roles of chairman or deputy chairman, because the assembly can block them by a majority.
One of the points about requiring a simple majority in the assembly, as I am sure the Committee will grasp, is that because it is elected under the proportional representation additional member system, it is extremely unlikely that any political party could ever get a simple majority. The only way in which a Mayor’s unsuitable nominations could be blocked would be if there were an effective coalition. The electoral system governing the composition of the GLA means that the tool we wish to provide the assembly with could not be fashioned into a partisan billhook. It would give the assembly, or responsible parties within it, the opportunity to block a future Mayor who wished to exercise his powers irresponsibly.
As the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington has pointed out, chairmen or deputy chairmen of the various functional bodies have at their disposal millions of pounds of public money. Through the amendment, we suggest that before the Mayor appoints individuals to those posts he should know that if he recommends people who are either politically convenient or to whom he owes a debt for some reason, and who are not up to the task, the GLA’s capacity to recommend that they not be appointed will force him to appoint individuals of real calibre.
I mentioned in the previous debate that in the United States the Senate has the power to recommend refusal in confirmation hearings. In the past, it has ensured that certain individuals who were inappropriate, either because of their ideology—such as the Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork—or because of other executive failings, could not be appointed. The Senate exercises that power with a degree of deliberation and an absence of partisanship in most circumstances, which bolsters its standing. For a simple majority in the GLA to prevent the Mayor from making an appointment is the most effective safeguard that we can think of against the frivolous, capricious, partisan or ideological or the brazen preferment of individuals who are unsuitable for the serious offices in question.
Given the failure of the Government to accept the amendment, I hope that they will look favourably on ensuring that the reserve scrutiny power can be exercised by the GLA.

Stephen Pound: The hon. Gentleman reminds me of a saying of Ernie Bevin, one of my great heroes, though a trifle left-wing, I have to say, for modern Labour tastes:
“If we had a little less democracy and a little more trust, we could get a lot more done in this country.”
I would not subscribe to Ernie Bevin’s dictum, but nor would I subscribe to the Boss Prendergast machine that we seem to be hearing about from the hon. Gentleman. We seem to be hearing a description of a city Administration that is more akin to James Michael Curley in Boston in the 1930s—a gloriously, magnificently corrupt Administration, it has to be said—than what we are actually faced with. There are checks and balances within this. Our duty as a Committee—it is an extraordinary privilege to sit for the first time on a Committee that contains four Fulham season ticket holders, particularly as that represents about 50 per cent. of the attendance—is to allow the disinfectant of sunlight to enter in while still allowing the smooth running of the operation of the GLA.
Were we to enter the strange, dystopic world described from the perspective of Surrey Heath, of political pals and people to whom favours are owed and to whom nods and winks are exchanged in the fetid walkways of the Thames side, people who somehow have some sort of political debt that can be repaid only by a position on the Museum of London—

Bob Neill: I am following the hon. Gentleman’s point closely, as ever, but would he not concede that it is sometimes desirable to have a process such as that suggested by my hon. Friend the Member for Surrey Heath as a safeguard to nominees who might wrongly be the subject of such a suspicion as the hon. Gentleman raises? Does he not concede that it could be thought, for example, that a Mayor might appoint an old friend and former colleague from other days as the deputy chairman of a significant functional body, because he had signed his nomination paper and been expelled from his political party for his pains in supporting the Mayor at an earlier stage? Would it not be better for a nominee—an admirable person—in such a situation to be able to say that he has the confidence and support of the assembly in its confirmation of office? I think that the hon. Gentleman gets my drift.

Stephen Pound: One would have to be deaf, dumb and blind not to have got that drift this morning; it is about as subtle as a sledgehammer. I take the hon. Gentleman’s comment. We tend to make mistakes if we see policy in terms of personality, and if we tend to think of legislation in terms of individuals. What we are talking about here is a system for all eventualities: a GLA for all seasons, rather than a man for all seasons. The hon. Gentleman, who has at least two jobs and earns twice as much as I do, is quite right not to apply for yet another one. That would be erring on the side of greed, which is an emotion to which he is a complete stranger.
The whole process and procedure of the GLA could come to a grinding halt if there were political malice and if people chose to oppose the appointments. At present, the Mayor must have heed to the voice of the assembly. Let us not forget that the Mayor must then notify the assembly, as page 52, line 12 of the Bill confirms, of his decision whether to accept or reject the recommendation. There is a strong element of public scrutiny. I have sympathy with the hon. Member for Surrey Heath—that is not an expression that I will ever repeat—in his wish to give the matter teeth, and his own sharp incisors have already been in evidence in the few hours for which the Committee has so far deliberated. However, do we need those additional teeth? I think that were we to put in this additional filter, it would inevitably slow down the process unnecessarily. There is nothing wrong with slowing down a process if it is a means to an end. In this case we have that procedure in the Bill. We have that check and balance. We have that balance whereby the GLA can operate and appointments can be made subject to scrutiny and subject to verification and statement by the Mayor, who must explain it. For us to go further would be a recipe for disaster.
Whereas I know that no men or women in the Committee today are malicious or would in any way wish to bring the whole process to a halt, there might at some stage be such people. I am talking not about particular individuals, but about people of that type. Let us stick with what we have got. If a relevant situation occurs in the future, by all means let us look at it, but at the moment the GLA is not Kansas city in the 1930s or Boston in the 1940s. The world would be rather more exciting if it were. Both those Administrations had extremely good music, but they were fairly corrupt. We are talking about a system that is accountable and transparent. We know what is going on and we have more than enough in the provisions to provide the essential balance between the legislative checks, the scrutiny procedure and the smooth running of the assembly.

Tom Brake: I am afraid that I oppose the amendment, although I hate to part company with the hon. Member for Surrey Heath, as we have been doing so well so far. Whether one likes it or not, the model that has been adopted for London government is very much a Mayor with a GLA to scrutinise what he does. Our debate about confirmation hearings was entirely appropriate because that is a way for the assembly to scrutinise the Mayor’s appointments. This amendment, however, which would give the assembly the power to block a mayoral nominee, goes against the grain of what has been agreed in relation to the GLA—the model of Mayor and a scrutinising assembly. Although I understand the reasons for the proposal and why it might be appropriate to have a fallback, on this one amendment I will have to part company with the hon. Gentleman.

Jim Fitzpatrick: My hon. Friend the Member for Ealing, North eloquently put the case on which I am about to elaborate. He was supported by the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington; I hope that it will not be the only time that he will join the Government during the Bill’s passage.
As I have already indicated, I believe that confirmation hearings provide the assembly with an important new power. They will enable the assembly to carry out a rigorous public scrutiny of candidates whom the Mayor wishes to appoint to the offices specified in clause 4 and to recommend to the Mayor whether the candidate should be appointed to the office. That is the crucial point.
The role of the assembly is to scrutinise the calibre of candidates and their suitability for appointment to the office in question, but it is right that the Mayor, as the executive of the GLA, should retain the final say over the statutory appointments he is required to make. Accepting the amendment would give the assembly the final say over which candidate should be appointed. It would risk blurring the currently clear lines of accountability for these appointments. We believe that it would compromise the assembly’s scrutiny role and it could lead to deadlock between the Mayor and the assembly over whom should be appointed. I hope that hon. Members can agree on the importance of retaining the distinct roles of the Mayor and the assembly in the confirmation hearings process, and that they will not seek to press the amendment.

Michael Gove: I am grateful to all the hon. Members who have spoken in the debate because I feel that all of them, in their own way, have only reinforced the case for the amendment.
 Let me first touch on one of the points that the Minister made. He talked about the doctrine of accountability and the way in which the amendment would blur accountability. Let us consider that thought for a moment. In the Bill as it stands there is provision for confirmation hearings: the assembly could express itself not content with an individual who has been put forward for office, and the Mayor could say, “Do you know what? That is a very good point, and I am afraid that this individual, now that you have cross-examined them and we know a little more about their record, is unsuitable. I withdraw the nomination.” He is perfectly at liberty to do that as part of the confirmation process. Indeed, it is explicitly made clear in the Bill that the Mayor will give his reasons for either going ahead in the event of GLA disquiet, or withdrawing.
 The legislation therefore already allows for the fact that, following assembly representations, the Mayor would withdraw a nomination, so the principle of sole mayoral appointment, unfettered by any level of scrutiny, has already been conceded. In that respect, the Mayor remains accountable. It is always his decision as to whom he puts forward. The assembly has no right of nomination; it simply has a right to say, after scrutinising an individual appointment, that it thinks it unsuitable. Our amendment would ensure that the Mayor could not ride roughshod over the assembly’s view.
I agree with the hon. Member for Ealing, North that we should not build legislation around existing personalities. One of the points about this Mayor is that he is an inevitably controversial figure. I am sure that we can all agree that he has done some good and some bad things in office, and that it would be wrong to paint every one of his actions in deepest black. Nevertheless, so far he is the only person to have occupied the role of Mayor of London, so we must use some of his actions as a precedent when scrutinising new powers or new limits on the power of the Mayor. One of the interesting things about the way in which the Mayor has handled his power—I suspect that we will return to it later—is his handling of the congestion charge. I am sure that we will hear some interesting comments on that.

Andrew Slaughter: I have been ruminating on the comment that has just been made—[Interruption.] I have it with me. The hon. Gentleman raises a point of general interest. He says that the current Mayor has been the only Mayor, so we should take heed of what he has done. However, as he is the only Mayor to have held the post—there will be others in future—would it not be sensible, rather than rushing to judgment and to legislation, to leave in abeyance the point that the hon. Gentleman makes, which he might advance many times during the Committee’s proceedings, and wait until we have three or four Mayors under our belts before we start tinkering around with possibly unnecessary legislation?

Michael Gove: I am grateful, as ever, for the hon. Gentleman’s intervention. It is interesting, because its premise is that we should wait until we have had three or four incumbents of the office before changing the powers of the incumbent. That is an argument against the whole Bill; it is an argument against bringing forward legislation. If I remember the Division lists correctly, the hon. Gentleman voted in favour of the Bill. In fact, I remember his speech in favour of it. He now seems to be disavowing that principle. I should be grateful if he clarified his position. Does he believe that it is appropriate, now that we have had a Mayor for several years, to consider the extent of his powers and influence, and amend it appropriately? I assume that he thinks that that is appropriate and, given his earlier vote in favour of limiting confirmation hearings simply to chairs and deputy chairs, that he accepts that there should be a new constraint on the Mayor’s capacity to appoint officers. If he wishes to disavow those votes, I am sure that the Committee will be very interested in his arguments.

Andrew Slaughter: I made the mistake, which I shall never make again, of not being back in the Chamberfor the hon. Gentleman’s winding-up speech, for which I apologised to him at the time. Had I been present, I should have been able to correct him when he said that I spoke in an unqualified way in favour of the powers that the Mayor had been exercising thus far. He is right that I voted in favour of Second Reading, but he is generalising from a particular point that I made. Clearly, it is important after six years to consider how the job is being done and how the post is going. However, some of the amendments appear to indicate—as the intervention of the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst suggested—if not vindictiveness, at least personal interest in what the current Mayor is doing. I am simply advising the hon. Member for Surrey Heath, if I may be so bold, to steer clear of that.

Michael Gove: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that clarification.
I, too, am sorry that the hon. Gentleman was not present to hear my summing up, not because it was a triumph of oratory—far from it—but because in the course of my remarks, I committed a terrible solecism—at least one. When I referred to comments made by the hon. Member for Ealing, Acton and Shepherd’s Bush in the debate, I called him the hon. Member for Hammersmith and Fulham. I would hate anyone to think that it is possible to confuse my hon. Friend the Member for Hammersmith and Fulham with the hon. Member for Ealing, Acton and Shepherd’s Bush. The reason why I made that mistake is partly that the hon. Gentleman was in a previous life leader, I believe, of Hammersmith and Fulham council, when it was led by the Labour party, before the Conservatives took over and reduced the council tax by a whopping 3 per cent.
In those benighted days, the hon. Member for Ealing, Acton and Shepherd’s Bush developed something of a reputation. It was because of that reputation that the mistaken title was indelibly branded on my mind, so apologies to him for that. I also apologise if I have misunderstood the burden of his remarks on Second Reading. My understanding was that he spoke in favour of all the provisions in the Bill. While other Labour Members who had concerns about key aspects of the Bill are not, amazingly, on the Committee, the hon. Gentleman, as someone who spoke in favour of every aspect of the Bill, finds himself here. I do not know how the process works because, as I explained earlier, Mr. O’Hara, I am new to these things.
The hon. Member for Ealing, Acton and Shepherd’s Bush has made an important point. It is true that we should not attempt to legislate for the Mayor’s office on the basis of the current Mayor’s personality. However, we cannot ignore how the Mayor has used his powers, because it suggests how a future Mayor, who may be less responsible or conscientious, might exploit the loopholes. I note that the Minister for Housing and Planning is shaking her head at the thought that any future Mayor could be less responsible or less conscientious than the incumbent, but I will pass over those internal Labour matters.
I was due to mention the congestion charge, to which I know that we shall return on its own merits. I have mentioned it now because when the Mayor was consulting on the westward extension of the congestion charge, he gave the impression that the process would be transparent and accountable, that there would be scrutiny of the new power that he wished to exercise and that there would be an informed debate. At the end of the consultation process, the Mayor basically said, “Look, I’m in charge, I’m the Executive, I’ve got responsibility. We’re extending it. Fiat, let it be.” And so it was. My concern is that when it comes to appointments to functional bodies, a future Mayor will be able to say to the assembly, “Look, you made a very good case as to why I should not appoint this person but, frankly, I’m in charge. I’ll do what I like”, which is what the current Mayor did with the westward extension of the congestion charge. That would unfortunately discredit the GLA and the whole process of confirmation that the Government are seeking to include in the Bill.

Martin Linton: The hon. Gentleman has omitted to mention the fact that after the Mayor stated that he was in favour of a westward extension of the congestion charge, he was re-elected by the people of London.

Michael Gove: I take the point that the Mayor was re-elected but, as we know, it was with a reduced majority. More importantly, if one disaggregates voting in London, one can see that in those areas affected by the westward extension of the congestion charge, particularly the area represented by the leader of the Conservatives on the GLA, Angie Bray, the Conservative vote went up while the Labour vote went down. In the subsequent borough elections in Kensington and Chelsea and in Hammersmith and Fulham, which are the areas affected by the westward extension of the congestion charge, the Labour vote was further depressed and the Conservative vote was significantly increased, which led to the transfer of control in Hammersmith and Fulham from Labour to Conservative.

Martin Linton: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way again. We seek your indulgence, Mr. O’Hara, to pursue the point, if it is relevant to the debate.

Edward O'Hara: Order. I am giving very close consideration as to whether the topic is becoming an end in itself.

Martin Linton: I seek to make two points. First, the westward extension of the congestion charge affects many more people than the residents of Kensington and Chelsea who are within the zone. It affects the whole of London and the traffic going through it.
Secondly, in my constituency there were many strong, articulate opponents of the western extension of the congestion charge, with whom I have every sympathy because it adversely affected them. The Mayor nevertheless won a majority in the mayoral elections, even in Battersea.

Michael Gove: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his point, but given the point that you made, Mr. O’Hara, I suspect that if I were to pursue this transport question further I would be going down a cul-de-sac and would be given a penalty notice. I give way to my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst, who I suspect will make a point about the broader principle that we are discussing.

Bob Neill: The hon. Members who have intervened on my hon. Friend have overlooked the broader principle, of which the congestion charge is but an example, that the imposition of the congestion charge required a resolution of the board of Transport for London. As the executive body, Transport for London imposed the charge to reflect the will of the Mayor, which we accept. Is that not a strong argument for the boards of all the functional bodies that carry out significant executive functions being subject to the scrutiny function? That is why this strengthened measure is the appropriate means by which to compel the Mayor to refrain from appointing people who may demonstrably not be up to the discharge of those executive functions.

Edward O'Hara: Getting back to the point—

Michael Gove: Thank you, Mr. O’Hara. My journey back to the central point was helped by the intervention from my hon. Friend, who has made the key point about Transport for London. We can debate which is the most important functional body, but Transport for London is certainly one of the most important. The question who fills those posts matters to Londoners, because the individuals who do so have key executive responsibilities.
The hon. Member for Ealing, North, quoted Ernie Bevin—I think it was him rather than Aneurin Bevan—saying that what we needed was
“a little less democracy and a little more trust”.
It is unsurprising that someone who had been in charge of the Transport and General Workers Union should have asked for less democracy and more trust. It is also unsurprising that Ernie Bevin, a classic old Labour figure who became addicted to the power of the Executive and increasingly distrustful of scrutiny, should have taken that position, but I am sorry to hear those words repeated in tones of reverence by the hon. Gentleman. I would have thought that one of the key legacies of Tony Blair’s years in power, which Labour party members should want to celebrate, is the principle of devolution and the idea that new gusts of accountability are going through previously closed corridors of power.

Stephen Pound: In quoting the great Ernie Bevin, who thought that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was a breakaway branch of the T and G, I was not endorsing the view. I was simply giving an example, and I specifically stated for the record that I was not endorsing those comments, sympathetic though I may be.

Michael Gove: I grateful for that clarification. Whether or not the hon. Gentleman endorses all Ernie Bevin’s sentiments, my concern is that if the Government were not to accept the amendment, we would see a flawed confirmation process. I accept the hon. Gentleman’s point that we do not have government in London that bears comparison with the boss culture in the United States during the 1920s and 1930s, but we are all aware of the lesson that it is only through the maintenance and use of effective scrutiny mechanisms that we can avoid the descent into rotten borough-ism. We have here a power that any responsible Mayor would welcome. Any responsible Mayor would be happy to see any of his nominees to these key posts go through a confirmation process and secure the additional support of an open vote in the assembly, which would underline their appropriateness for the job. The Mayor has been perfectly happy to accept that the principle of election is the basis of the authority on which he operates. Why should there not be a similar vote for his nominees?
I know that the fact that the Liberal Democrats have deserted us on this occasion may appear to weaken the force of our argument.

Jim Fitzpatrick: I am interested that the hon. Gentleman has said that the absence of Liberal Democrat support weakens the force of his argument. Did he not start this debate by saying that had we not defeated the last amendment, he would not be proposing these amendments? The hon. Gentleman did not have a very strong argument to start with.

Michael Gove: No; I was making a point. At first glance, to the superficial observer of our deliberations, it might seem as though the desertion of the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington weakens the force of our argument. In fact, his conscientious objection strengthens it, because for any majority to exist within the GLA, Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, for the sake of argument, need to work together. Those people who think that we are joined at the hip and that we are one unified, raucous, populist caucus intent on subverting the power of the executive will have been disabused by the hon. Gentleman’s decision not to vote with us. That Tories and Liberal Democrats disagree emphasises the point that when it comes to the appointment of individuals, one cannot expect all the Opposition parties to unite against the Mayor.
By declining to support the amendment, the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington has underlined the fact that the parties operate independently in the GLA and that our requirement for a simple majority for confirmations is an effective new scrutiny weapon which, in the absence of the previous amendment, can only enhance trust in the Mayor’s appointments. I therefore hope that the Government will accept it.

Question put, That the amendment be made:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 4, Noes 11.

Question accordingly negatived.

Question proposed, That this schedule be the First schedule to the Bill.

Jim Fitzpatrick: Schedule 1 inserts a new schedule 4A to the GLA Act 1999, setting out the procedure for holding confirmation hearings for the assembly to make a recommendation to the Mayor on whether a candidate should be appointed to one of the offices listed in clause 4.
Paragraph 1 exempts the Mayor from the confirmation hearing process should he decide to appoint himself to any of the offices listed in clause 4. That is because the assembly already has opportunities to question the Mayor at, for example, the monthly meetings.
Paragraph 2 prohibits the Mayor from making an appointment until the end of the confirmation process, which is either when the Mayor has notified the assembly of his acceptance or rejection of its recommendation or if the assembly has not made a recommendation to the Mayor within three weeks of being notified by him of the candidate whom he proposes to appoint.
Paragraph 3 specifies what the notification should include and requires the Mayor to give reasons why he wishes to appoint the candidate to the office. Paragraphs 4 and 5 set out the key outcomes of the procedure. Paragraph 4 requires the assembly to recommend to the Mayor whether he should appoint the candidate to the office within three weeks of receiving notification from him. Paragraph 5 allows the Mayor to accept or reject the assembly’s recommendation. The Mayor must notify the assembly of his decision.
Paragraphs 6 to 9 set out the detailed procedure for holding confirmation hearings. Paragraph 6 allows the assembly to decide whether to hold a confirmation hearing before making a recommendation to the Mayor, and it defines a confirmation hearing as a meeting at which the candidate is requested to appear to answer assembly members’ questions relating to the proposed appointment. The candidate may either attend the meeting in person or communicate with the assembly remotely. The assembly may ask candidates to produce documents in their possession or under their control that relate to the proposed appointment.
Paragraph 7 sets out the procedure for requesting the candidate’s appearance at a confirmation hearing. Paragraph 8 allows the Secretary of State by order to make provision for any order in force under section 63 of the Greater London Authority Act 1999 to have effect in relation to a candidate. Such an order may prescribe categories of information that a person summoned to give evidence to the assembly may refuse to give and categories of document which they may refuse to produce.
Finally, paragraph 9 provides for the assembly’s functions under the schedule to be undertaken only by the assembly as a whole or by an ordinary committee of the assembly. I beg to move that this schedule be part of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Schedule 1 agreed to.

Clause 5 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 6

Annual report by the Assembly

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Jim Fitzpatrick: Clause 6 provides for the assembly to prepare an annual report on its work and achievements during the year. The report will be prepared at the end of each financial year and must be sent to the Mayor before it is published. For a period of six years, the report submitted to the Mayor should be kept available both for viewing at the offices of the authority and, for a nominal fee, for sending to any person on request.
 Requiring the assembly to produce an annual report will increase its public accountability and raise its profile among Londoners. The report will enable the assembly to set out its work and achievements over the previous 12 months. It will also complement the Mayor’s report on the exercise of his statutory functions.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 6 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 7

Staff appointed under section 67(2) of the GLA Act 1999

Tom Brake: I beg to move amendment No. 56, in clause 7, page 5, leave out lines 3 and 4 and insert
‘may, following consultation with the Mayor and Assembly, determine any matter affecting the establishment of the Authority.’.

Edward O'Hara: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment No. 57, in clause 7, page 5, line 4, at end insert—
‘(2A) The head of the Authority’s paid service shall give not less than 28 days’ notice in writing to the Assembly, together with reasons, before determining any matter affecting the establishment of the Authority.
(2B) The head of the Authority’s paid service shall have regard to any comment expressed by the Mayor and the Assembly within the period of 28 days of the giving of that notice.
(2C) On making a determination affecting any matter affecting the establishment of the Authority, the head of the Authority’s paid service shall, if he has received comments under subsection (2B) above, make a statement in writing setting out the reasons why any comments so submitted are not accepted.
(2D) For the purposes of this section, the expression “any matters affecting the establishment of the Authority” shall in relating to a post or posts appointed under subsection (2), mean—
(a) the total number of any such posts;
(b) the grading of any such posts;
(c) the functions of any such posts; and
(d) such of the terms and conditions of employment that relate to the functions of any such post.’.
Clause stand part.
Amendment No. 40, in clause 8, page 6, line 15, leave out subsection (6).
Amendment No. 58, in clause 8, page 6, line 19, at end insert
‘except any function of the Authority’s paid service to which sections 67(2A) to (2D) apply’.
Clause 8 stand part.

Tom Brake: The Great London Authority Act 1999 provides that the assembly is responsible for appointing staff to the authority, including those responsible for the three distinct roles of setting the establishment, agreeing staffing-related policies and procedures and appointing staff. In practice, assembly members are not involved directly in the appointment of staff other than to senior posts within the secretariat, the statutory officers, and director-level appointments across the rest of the authority. This highlights an important distinction in respect of the staffing establishment—the creation and deletion of positions—and the appointment of staff, filling the posts that have already been created on the staff establishment. The Bill would transfer responsibility for creating and deleting posts and appointing staff to those posts—apart from the head of paid service, the statutory finance officer and the monitoring officer who would be appointed jointly by the Mayor and assembly—from the London Assembly to the Greater London Authority’s head of paid service.
Amendments Nos. 56 and 57 would, if amendments Nos. 39 or 40 were not accepted, amend the Bill to put in place safeguards requiring the head of paid service to consult the Mayor and assembly before taking decisions relating to the establishment of the authority, and prevent the head of paid service from delegating his functions in relation to the creation and deletion of posts to any other officer of the authority. The assembly unanimously supports the introduction of these safeguards, so again the Minister is in a position where amendments are being put forward with the full support of all parties on the assembly. Clearly, GLA members will look carefully at this debate to see why, if the Minister chooses to refuse these amendments, he has taken that position.
 The head of paid service must be placed under a statutory duty to consult the London assembly and the Mayor in advance of any decision on the creation and deletion of posts within the authority's staffing establishment. That would ensure that the head of paid service has regard to the views of the Mayor and assembly, and is accountable to them for his decisions. It would also ensure that the current degree of transparency in decision making about staffing policies and procedures, and the size and functions of the establishment, is retained.
The head of paid service should not be allowed to delegate his powers relating to the creation and deletion of posts in the authority. The power so to delegate could result in a diffusion of responsibility and accountability, as well as potentially making the decision-making process less transparent. If the Government choose not to accept amendments Nos. 56 and 57, amendment No. 40 would maintain the status quo so that the assembly remained responsible for staffing matters within the authority—with the exception of the head of paid service, the statutory finance officer and monitoring officer, who would be jointly appointed by the Mayor and assembly.
When the Minister responds, he thus has two options. He, or the Minister for Housing and Planning, whom I welcome to the Front Bench, could opt to explain why the status quo is not favoured when it provides certain safeguards but does not stop the Mayor and the authority functioning effectively. The Minister for Housing and Planning could say why she is unhappy with those present arrangements; she also has the opportunity to explain why she is not supporting safeguards that could be put in place when this change, if it occurs, will see the head of paid service take responsibility for staff. I will listen carefully to the Minister’s reply, and hold fire until I have heard that, before seeing how I want to proceed with these particular amendments.

Michael Gove: I support the principle and detail of the amendments standing in the name of the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington. After the briefest of estrangements over this debate, I am happy that we are once more reunited. It is wonderful to have the warm embrace of the Liberal Democrats once more restored. I will make no comment about the hon. Member for Montgomeryshire (Lembit Öpik), or about the Liberal Democrats leaving and then re-embracing other individuals.
As to the matter under debate, the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington pointed out that the current arrangement works well. It has the merit of ensuring that the assembly has an important role to play in staff appointments. It is important to clear up any concerns that some may have. It is not the case that the assembly is responsible for the meanest and lowliest staff appointment, as some may think. The assembly is not responsible for every discharge of executive function but, crucially, it determines the overall staff complement and has a key role in certain important staff appointments. It is important to appreciate why this system, which I accept is distinctive and not replicated in any other part of local government, has worked well so far. That is because it ensures that debates about staffing can occur transparently and openly, by operating across parties.
 One concern that many people had about the mayoral system, and the idea of an executive Mayor, was its departure from existing local government practice in England and Wales. There was concern that we would see municipal Bonapartism—that rather than a Napoleon of Notting Hill, there would be a Napoleon for the whole of London—and that questions of staffing, the discharge of executive functions and policy would be decided by the Mayor and his kitchen cabinet without appropriate openness or transparency.
 The Liberal Democrats and I, and my Back-Bench colleagues, have been trying—and will try during the progress on the Bill—to bring those decisions into the light wherever possible, whether on planning, housing or any other area, to ensure that there is maximum transparency and accountability. One good thing about this legislation which the Government originally brought forward in their first term was that there was already greater transparency and accountability about the creation of the staff complement. Because it was the assembly that debated and fixed those matters, it was not simply the case that the Mayor, in the privacy of his own kitchen cabinet, could take his decisions; we could have extensive public scrutiny of them. As a result of that, there is general agreement that the system has worked well. What we are likely to see here is a departure from a system that is transparent and open and works well to a system that will favour the Mayor and limit the degree of transparency and openness.
It might be argued that the new system is closer to local government practice and to the principle that a chief executive should be responsible for appointing staff. In fact, it marks a departure away from a welcome precedent that the Government established in the original legislation. One of the things that it is important to recognise is that the Mayor of London occupies a distinctive position in the whole system of governance that we have in the UK. We do not have any other analogous individual who exercises such a degree of power. To try to say that the Mayor should have all the benefits but none of the constraints that apply in local government elsewhere is to shift the balance in a way that we consider to be unfortunate.
I know that some people will say that all that is proposed is that a bureaucrat—an enlightened bureaucrat at that, a head of paid service—is responsible for discharging those functions. However, that individual will find that he or she comes more under the sway of the Mayor and the Mayor’s private office, and is less directly accountable to the assembly than is the case at the moment. Given the way that the Government seek to try to remove transparency and accountability from the current process of setting the staff complement, we believe that the Liberal Democrat amendments, by seeking to preserve the existing system, strike a blow for greater accountability, which should be at the heart of every measure within the Bill. We are therefore more than happy to support the amendments that stand in the name of the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington.

Bob Neill: May I support the principle of what has been said by my hon. Friend? I will trespass on the Committee’s time for a short period to reinforce that in practice. It will be a shame if, for what I accept are genuinely good intentions, the Government disturb a system that has worked well, and is regarded by those people who are members of the assembly and by those who work for the GLA as having worked well. The assembly has never sought to use its current power to interfere in the vast majority of appointments. I have referred on other occasions to one or two rather controversial appointments that the Mayor has made within the staff of the GLA. There was some political controversy about that, and some controversy in the press, but at the end of the day, those of us who thought that they were mistaken appointments, having made our point, did not seek to obstruct them through the mechanism of the assembly.
It was also important that the Mayor had to seek an accommodation with the parties in the assembly to make sure that what he did was acceptable, in broad terms, to public policy. It is worth paying tribute to the current leader of the Labour group on the London assembly, Len Duval, who, during those early periods, was chairman of the business management and appointments committee of the assembly, and who worked in co-operation with Conservative and Liberal Democrat leaders—I was one of them—to ensure that we did not get involved in confrontation. The assembly has not abused its current powers. On the contrary, it has used them in a measured way. So why move away from them? “If it’s not broke, don’t fix it” is a pretty good maxim. I know that the Minister regards Mr. Duval’s judgment highly, in these and all matters, including that most important, which has been alluded to—the fortunes of the great West Ham United. I hope that he will think again about his judgment there.
May I make two other short points? This is not a criticism of the chief executive, the current head of paid service, who is recognised on all sides as a public servant of most outstanding calibre who has worked well with all parties in the assembly and with the Mayor. However, such a post holder is put in a difficult situation. The assembly has taken decisions on staffing at a high level, in public, through its business management and appointments committee, and reports have been made in public to the full assembly. That transparency is hugely important and should not be compromised, which is a concern that we have for the integrity of the working of the organisation.

Tom Brake: I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way. Does he agree that the changes go against the trend? Confirmation hearings are about providing more checks and balances, whereas the provision goes in the opposite direction. Does he also agree that it would be pertinent for members to know what the current head of paid service thinks about the changes? He will be required to implement them and he might have views on how that could be done and how effective they will be. I hope that when the Minister responds she will be able to confirm what consultation with him was carried out and what his view is.

Bob Neill: As far as I am aware, the head of paid service has operated with the level of discretion that I would have expected had he been, for example, the permanent secretary of a Department of State, which he might well have been had his career taken a different path. No officers of the GLA have sought the power in question, and it is difficult to see where it has come from. I do not wish to strike an uncharitable note, but I hope that it is not the result of a trade-off to make up for disappointment about other powers being given to the Mayor. There has been no suggestion from any professional body that the change is needed. That was the important point that the hon. Gentleman made.
 I shall not trespass on to municipal Bonapartism, beyond observing that between 1870 and 1873 Chislehurst was the world centre of Bonapartism—it was the residence-in-exile of the emperor Napoleon III, who promptly died and so never had to be put to an electoral test. I note that for the history buffs among us. The principal point has been well made by the Front-Bench spokesmen of both Opposition parties.
 Mr. Slaughter rose—

Bob Neill: I hope that this is not about Napoleon III.

Andrew Slaughter: No, it certainly is not, although I am sure that the hon. Gentleman is a worthy successor to him.
The hon. Gentleman will forgive me if I am wrong, but in his comments on the Labour members of the assembly, is he implying that they support the line that Opposition members of the Committee are taking and that they are happy with the current situation? That is not my understanding from speaking to them. I wonder whether he is over-egging his argument by saying that there is wholehearted opposition to the proposal within the GLA.

Bob Neill: I am sorry, Mr. O’Hara, but it seems, with respect, that the hon. Gentleman may not have been listening to me. I was saying that all parties in the assembly have worked together to make the system work well in practice. That is why it is not broke and does not need fixing. I was certainly not misrepresenting what Labour assembly members say. They certainly agreed that if there were to be any changes, safeguards needed to be put in place to ensure transparency and probity. I believe that they abstained on the matters passed by other parties, and they were put in a difficult position.

Tom Brake: The hon. Gentleman has made a point that I was going to make: all parties agreed that if staffing transfers were to take place, the safeguards referred to in the amendments would need to be put in place. Is he as confused as I am about the weight that is being given to the views of assembly members, including Labour members, and those of another party that we cannot quite identify? That validity of that party’s concerns is clearly being given more weight than those of London assembly members of all parties.

Bob Neill: The hon. Gentleman makes a valid point. Given the history, it is difficult to discern where the drive for the idea has come from. The assumption will be that it came from the Mayor or from his office, but it is worth remembering that the assembly has as good a mandate as the Mayor—it is elected at the same time by the same people. It would be interesting to know why the Government feel obliged to adopt one particular course when there is a clear and coherent consensus against it and when, as the hon. Gentleman observed, the proposal flies against the general intellectual thrust of the Bill. That troubles me.
I think that that makes my point, though I shall just mention to the hon. Member for Ealing, Acton and Shepherd's Bush that Napoleon III was elected President of the French republic by an overwhelming majority. So I am happy to follow him in some regards.

Edward O'Hara: Order. I think that we have heard enough of Napoleon III.

Yvette Cooper: I apologise for having missed the opening hour of the sitting owing to a long-standing engagement. It is a pleasure to serve under your Chairmanship, Mr. O’Hara. I am sure that the debate will be cheerful throughout our proceedings on the Bill, even when we disagree.
This part of the debate covers both a number of amendments that have been tabled and the matter of clause stand part. In my response I shall therefore first cover the purpose of the proposed provisions and then the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington.
Section 67 of the Greater London Assembly Act 1999 provides for the appointment of three categories of authority staff. First, the Mayor can appoint two political advisers. Those are personal appointments made by the Mayor alone. Secondly, the Mayor can appoint not more than 10 other members of staff whose posts are open to competition, with appointment on merit. Finally, the assembly appoints all other authority staff after consultation with the Mayor.
Clause 7 provides for the staff who are currently appointed by the Assembly to be appointed in future by the authority’s head of paid service, who is the most senior GLA official. He will be obliged to consult the Mayor and the assembly before making an appointment, and he will need to have regard to available resources and to the priorities of the authority. Clause 7 also amends section 70(2) of 1999 Act to allow the head of paid service to set the terms and conditions of the staff whom he appoints, again after consultation with the Mayor and assembly. The appointment terms and conditions of current staff will have effect as if they were appointed by him.
Clause 8 amends section 72 of the 1999 Act to enable the Mayor and assembly, acting jointly—which is important, to appoint the authority’s head of paid service and set his terms and conditions. It also allows the head of paid service to delegate any of his staffing functions to a member of staff of the authority, other than to staff appointed by the Mayor. Finally, it provides that the head of paid service cannot also be a member of the authority staff appointed by the Mayor under section 67(1).
 So a series of safeguards is built into the clauses. The hon. Member for Surrey Heath was concerned that the Mayor would be given unrestricted power to appoint a kitchen cabinet, but the reverse is true—we are establishing a head of paid service whose appointment will be a joint one, and we are allowing that jointly appointed official to appoint the remaining GLA staff.

Michael Gove: Will the Minister say precisely what is wrong with the current system?

Yvette Cooper: I shall come to that. The purpose of making the changes is relatively limited, but the clauses provide some benefits over the current system. The current system is slightly anomalous in that, although the GLA’s staff are largely engaged in carrying out the Mayor’s programme, they depend on the assembly for their terms and conditions; they are, effectively, appointed by the assembly. The GLA has two branches, one of which largely decides the work programme, while the other is responsible for staffing, appointments and terms and conditions. There are certain anomalies and potential unhealthy tensions in that arrangement. Clearly, it is important for there to be a certain amount of tension between the Mayor and the assembly. That is the purpose of scrutiny; it is a healthy tension to create within a democracy.
We should consider with caution whether it is wise for the terms and conditions of the non-political appointees who carry out the work of the GLA to be part of the political tension between the Mayor and the assembly, and so to be potentially subject to the disagreements, rows, trade-offs and arguments that inevitably take place between them. That is why we thought that it would be a better arrangement for such staff to have a jointly appointed head of paid service who, after consulting both branches of the GLA, could make appointments and staffing decisions in the interests of the whole GLA.

Tom Brake: The Minister referred to “potential” unhealthy tensions. Can she list any actual unhealthy tensions that have prompted the change?

Yvette Cooper: There are accounts of discussions between the Mayor and the assembly having involved decisions about staffing. The Bill aims to ensure that there are sensible constitutional arrangements for the GLA, and to do so in a way that anticipates potential tensions rather than simply responding to existing arrangements. The hon. Member for Surrey Heath is very concerned to ensure that we anticipate the decision making of future Mayors and assemblies. Given his fear that future Mayors might not be as responsible as the current one, I would say to him that the way to ensure that that is not the case is to join us in backing the current Mayor for a further term of office, rather than engaging, in the style of “The X Factor”, in a search for an alternative, who would, I am sure, be far more irresponsible in the execution of all his powers.
This is simply about trying to ensure that the GLA’s staffing arrangements are sensible.
 Michael Gove rose—

Stephen Pound: Ah, a candidate for Mayor.

Michael Gove: In the Minister’s last sentence, even though there were a number of subordinate clauses, there were more contradictions than is normally the case in her arguments. Let me briefly refer to two of them. The first is her invitation for us to back the current Mayor on the basis that any other alternative would be less conscientious or less responsible. My argument is that most alternatives, particularly the Conservative alternative, would be significantly more conscientious and more responsible.
However, it is conceivable that a future Labour politician will, by some fluke, find himself in that position and be less conscientious and less responsible. That goes to the heart of the logical flaw in the Minister’s argument. She said that she wanted to ensure that in future there could be no irresponsible exercise of power. However, at the moment, as my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst pointed out, because decisions are taken in the open, through the process of negotiation in the assembly, we have a highly effective check against the abuse of powers. If the Government get their way, the head of paid service will find himself or herself susceptible to greater influence from the Mayor acting alone than is the case at the moment. A deliberative assembly with 25 members discussing something in the open is clearly less susceptible to covert pressure than is an individual.

Edward O'Hara: Order. The Minister has the Floor. That was supposed to be an intervention.

Yvette Cooper: The hon. Member for Surrey Heath is confident that any Conservative candidate would be more responsible than the current Mayor. That point is unfortunately undermined by the lack of a Conservative candidate who is prepared to stand against the current Mayor. The hon. Member for Surrey Heath has such a strong and growing personal interest in London that perhaps he could be prevailed upon to be a candidate himself, should all else fail.
The hon. Gentleman was trying to make a point about the need for negotiation and open debate, which is extremely important. It is part of the assembly’s role to hold the Mayor to account, to promote openness, transparency and debate and to have a healthy tension with the Mayor about particular issues of disagreement. However, we should be cautious about making the terms and conditions of non-political GLA staff part of the territory for political argument, debate and negotiation. Is that the kind of thing on which we want the assembly to focus its attention, when it should be concentrating on scrutinising policies and delivery?
Why not leave matters such as staff terms and conditions to the head of paid service according to long-standing parliamentary and ministerial tradition? Ministers play one role and are accountable to Parliament, but we allow Departments and the civil service to take decisions about staffing and terms and conditions. We are trying to focus the assembly and the Mayor on what is important to them, rather than allowing them to get into inappropriate rows, trade-offs and negotiations about practical matters such as terms and conditions and staffing arrangements, which might properly be done by the head of paid service. It is important to note that the head of paid service will be jointly appointed by the Mayor and the assembly and will be accountable to both for decisions on staffing.

Michael Gove: The Minister has said that the GLA should have a scrutiny role, but whenever we introduce a proposal to strengthen GLA scrutiny, the Government reject it, which they show every sign of continuing to do. In the one area in which the GLA’s powers are strong, the Government propose to weaken them. Why?

Yvette Cooper: The hon. Gentleman obviously wants debates about other aspects of scrutiny, and it would be inappropriate for us to be diverted from the particular measures—

Edward O'Hara: Order. I thank the Minister for that comment. I remind members of the Committee of the terms of debate on these two clauses.

Yvette Cooper: Thank you, Mr. O’Hara. We are making important changes to the scrutiny of confirmation hearings, which we have discussed, and to other matters, which the Committee will have the opportunity to discuss in detail. The issue that we are discussing now is a practical measure to ensure that attention is focused on matters that should rightly be the subject of open, transparent disagreement between the different branches of the GLA, while allowing the organisation to function as effectively as possible in managing and organising its staff, terms and conditions and so on.
The amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington are unnecessary and would be too bureaucratic in practice. There is already a requirement on the head of paid service to consult the Mayor and the assembly and to have regard to their views when determining the number, grading and function of GLA staff. However, it would be inappropriate to prevent the head of paid service from delegating those appointment functions. The head of paid service continues to have responsibility and accountability for those functions, but it is not right that that officer should have to take every decision about every appointment or staffing issue, as those matters can sensibly be delegated to other officers as long as the line of accountability is very clear.
A consultation period of 28 days before the head of paid service can make decisions would introduce delays and bureaucracy into a system that should be able to respond flexibly. In particular circumstances, the head of paid service may want a 28-day consultation period and a series of engagements and consultations, but specifying a 28-day consultation period, written representations and written statements and responses would make it harder for the head of paid service to do a practical management job in the interests of the GLA as a whole.

Andrew Pelling: I apologise for not being here earlier. I was at a joint press conference with the Mayor about the operation of Croydon Tramlink. It is a great privilege to serve under your chairmanship, Mr. O’Hara.
Bearing in mind that this is one of two key areas of scrutiny provided to the assembly under the original 1999 Act, does the Minister feel that the assembly has been ineffective in using that ability? She has prayed in aid efficiency, but is that important enough to warrant taking this element of scrutiny away from the assembly?

Yvette Cooper: I think that I have addressed the hon. Gentleman’s points already. The amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington would introduce inefficiencies. I am concerned about those amendments, because they are not the most effective way of ensuring effective management. I am concerned about the current arrangements on appointments between the Mayor and the assembly, because it is anomalous for the work programme to be decided by one branch and staffing arrangements by another. That may lead to staffing terms and conditions for non-political appointments becoming part of the territory of trade-offs, negotiations, rows and debates between the assembly and the Mayor, which is not the best way to get effective staff arrangements for the GLA in the long term.
 This is a relatively limited, practical measure that will not have a substantial effect on the scrutiny of the assembly—in fact; it will allow it to concentrate on serious scrutiny—and it will not give any other branch of the GLA any more or different powers. This is purely about practical arrangements to support the staff.

Bob Neill: I am trying to follow the Minister’s argument. Can she provide an example of the current powers being used to politicise the terms and conditions of appointment of non-political members of staff? Is there a current example of the process working badly? Surely that would have been foreseen by the Government when the Bill was introduced six years ago. Where is the evidence to suggest that there is anything other than a peripheral, potential risk? Where is the problem in practice?

Yvette Cooper: Hon. Members have said throughout that the Bill is about making sensible changes that do not simply respond to the existing arrangements, but also anticipate potential arrangements, such as the future disposition of the Mayor and the assembly. Concerns have been raised in some quarters about staffing issues being discussed by the Mayor and the assembly, but those are not the reason for making the changes. The reason is that the changes seem pretty sensible and allow us to make long-term arrangements to prevent staffing arrangements being used as a political football in discussions between the Mayor and the assembly.
This is not a major change, and it will not cause problems and substantial difficulties in any quarter. It is a relatively sensible, not hugely interesting change that will improve support for the GLA staff.

Andrew Pelling: Is the Minister saying not that the assembly has abused this power, but that it was just an error to include it in the original 1999 Act?

Yvette Cooper: We have watched the operation of the Mayor and the assembly and have learned about the importance of focusing on scrutiny, which needs to take place, and about the need for the Mayor and the assembly to focus on things that matter. There has been a process examining whether the original 1999 Act best serves that end or whether sensible amendments can be made. We have concluded that amending the system is sensible and will improve how the GLA functions in a relatively limited way. Opposition Members cannot sensibly object to those amendments.

Greg Hands: I wonder whether the Minister has read the London assembly briefing on that specific point? She thinks that the proposed changes are not particularly significant or controversial, but the assembly itself has told us that the Bill provides for changes relating to the appointment of staff
“which will constitute a significant shift in power away from the assembly at a time when existing arrangements function well.”

Yvette Cooper: There are two questions for the assembly. First, why does it think that its involvement in staff terms and conditions is so significant? Secondly, should it be the assembly’s function to be involved in and responsible for the terms and conditions of junior GLA staff? Should the assembly see that as an important part of its debate and political tensions with and scrutiny of the Mayor? Should it not simply concentrate on overall delivery and policy and allow non-political appointments to the GLA to be conducted by a head of paid service, who is accountable to the assembly and the Mayor jointly?
If the Government were proposing a head of paid service accountable only to the Mayor, I could understand why the assembly might raise concerns, but we are not. We are saying that the head of paid service should be responsible to both the Mayor and the assembly. The measure is a practical one that will allow a sensible, functional arrangement for GLA work patterns.

Tom Brake: The Minister has referred to potentially unhealthy tensions. Will she accept that the head of paid service might well sit in the middle of such tensions, with the Mayor and assembly requiring him to do different things? How about that for potentially unhealthy tensions?

Yvette Cooper: In those circumstances, the head of paid service should listen to both, decide the right thing to do and take responsible decisions on the required staffing arrangements. The alternative is for the issues to be part of the public territory and of rows between the Mayor and the assembly.
Both the Mayor and the assembly need to understand that the staffing arrangements and the terms and conditions concern the employment of people who do significant jobs for the assembly but who are not part of the main mayoral appointments or the three key executive appointments, which are made jointly. Neither the Mayor nor the assembly should use the more junior appointments that are part of the GLA as political territory in the debates and rows between them. All that the measures will do is put such appointments on a sensible footing. I am not sure whether hon. Members are desperate to keep this debate going in order to prevent us from reaching other clauses, but I feel that I have made my points as often as it is possible to make them.
 Several hon. Members rose—

Yvette Cooper: I shall take one last intervention from the hon. Member for Surrey Heath, or allow the hon. Gentlemen to choose among themselves who will speak, but there is a limit to what more can be said.

Michael Gove: The Minister has only herself to blame on this occasion. The more she explains, the more obscure the justification becomes. She has talked about the GLA’s vital role in scrutinising executive responsibilities. The GLA has exercised its scrutiny function, and it has said that such an accretion of executive responsibilities to the head of paid service is wrong. She cannot say that the GLA should restrict itself to scrutiny, and then say when it expresses an opinion, “These people are wrong, I personally find the matter not particularly interesting and, as ever, executive convenience should come before scrutiny.” That is no way to deal with the governance of London.

Yvette Cooper: Opposition Members protest too much. They do not honestly believe that the terms and conditions of junior staff of the GLA should be a critical matter of scrutiny for assembly members. They clearly want to make a political point, and they have had plenty of opportunity to do so. If they are really thinking sensibly about practical arrangements for the management of GLA staff, they will recognise that the provisions are perfectly sensible and respectable and will have benefits by preventing the staff from becoming political footballs to be used by various branches of the GLA. The clauses certainly do not do any of the terrible things that Opposition Members have suggested, and they should be supported for practical reasons.

Tom Brake: In her opening sentence, the Minister said that she wanted a cheerful debate. It is a pity that she was not here when the Under-Secretary gave Opposition Members something to cheer about—the indication that he would introduce an amendment on the subject covered by amendment No. 38, which we welcome. It is a pity that she did not continue in the same vein and maintain the general sense of bonhomie and festive afterglow.
We listened carefully to the reasons she gave for the “sensible changes”, as the Minister called them, but I am afraid that we heard no good reasons. We heard a series of allegations—the phrases used included “concerns expressed in some quarters”, “heard of some tensions” and “potential rows between assembly members and the Mayor”—but she could not provide any examples. We have in Committee two assembly members who would no doubt have contributed examples of those rows, tensions and concerns, if there had been any. The Minister gave no hard facts to justify the changes.

Andrew Slaughter: I am reluctant to prolong the debate because, like my hon. Friend the Minister, I suspect that this is a phantom attack. The more I hear from the Opposition parties, the more I believe that they are trying to make something out of not very much. As I understand it, the proposal is that the senior non-political officer of the authority, with joint responsibility for the assembly and the Mayor, will deal with staffing matters. To my mind, that is exactly what happens in most other local authorities.
My hon. Friend the Minister will not say this, but I shall: there is an anomaly in the 1999 Act that needs correction. It is surely far more sensible for non-political officers to have the responsibility in question. The possibility that the shrinking violet, the head of paid service, might not be able to arbitrate between political parties was considered in the regulatory impact assessment, but the argument is clearly nonsense and was dismissed. The hon. Gentleman is clearly making too much of it.

Tom Brake: I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention, but it does not divert me from my course. If the Minister is proposing a change to an Act that has been in place for more than six years and is, by all accounts, operating effectively, she should present to members of the Committee hard reasons why she is not happy with the present arrangements and wants to change them. She has not done so. She has simply referred to allocations made and concerns expressed by a source whose identity she has not clarified for the benefit of Opposition Members—I do not know whether she has clarified the matter for Government Members. She has not confirmed the source of the alleged tensions and concerns, and she has done nothing to dispel the concern, which is shared by me and Conservative Members, that the change is being driven by the Mayor and flies in the face of a system that appears to be operating effectively and has the support of Assembly members. I shall not therefore withdraw the amendment but will press it to a Division.

Question put, That the amendment be made:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 6, Noes 10.

Question accordingly negatived.
Further consideration adjourned.—[Jonathan Shaw.]

Adjourned accordingly at nine minutes to One o’clock till this day at Four o’clock.